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18  U.S.C.  § 922(G)(1)  UNDER  ATTACK:  THE  CASE
FOR  AS-APPLIED  CHALLENGES  TO  THE
FELON-IN-POSSESSION  BAN
Kari Lorentson*
INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the landmark decision announced in District of Columbia v. Heller
established that the Second Amendment protects the individual right of “law-
abiding . . . citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”1  One dec-
ade has now passed since Heller was decided, but the Supreme Court has
remained largely silent about the scope and applicability of the Second
Amendment.2  Lower courts, as a result, have been left to grapple with the
silence.  Courts of appeals have formulated frameworks to apply in cases
involving constitutional challenges to firearm regulations.  This Note will
evaluate a current split in the federal courts of appeals—a divide about
whether courts should entertain as-applied challenges to the felon-in-posses-
sion ban codified in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  This Note will examine most
closely a recent decision from the Third Circuit, Binderup v. Attorney General,3
and contemplate the court’s analysis as a potential framework to apply going
forward.
Part I of this Note outlines the relevant statutory scheme governing the
felon-in-possession ban, along with its applicable exceptions.  Part II surveys
landmark Supreme Court precedent related to the Second Amendment—
namely, District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago.  In Part
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science, American University, 2015.  I would like to acknowledge Professor Bill
Kelley for serving as my faculty advisor, and I am grateful to the staff of the Notre Dame Law
Review for their diligent editing and support.  All errors are my own.
1 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
2 Of the nine Justices on the Court, Justice Thomas has most forcefully denounced
the Court’s failure to resolve legal questions related to the Second Amendment.  In a
recent denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari, Justice Thomas, in dissent, lamented:
“We have not heard argument in a Second Amendment case for nearly eight years.  And
we have not clarified the standard for assessing Second Amendment claims for almost 10
[years].”  Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (citing Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari)).
3 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016).
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III, this Note conducts an overview of the current circuit split percolating in
the courts of appeals.  Part IV presents a rationale and justification for per-
mitting judicial review of as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1).  Finally, Part V
provides a critique of the Binderup analysis and puts forth an alternative stan-
dard to analyze similar cases.
I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME OF FEDERAL FIREARM REGULATIONS
A. Statutory Scheme
Federal firearm regulations were not commonplace until the beginning
of the twentieth century.4  With the advent of the reform-oriented Progres-
sive Era, crime was perceived “both as a major problem and as a national
one.”5  In 1927, the first federal statute to regulate firearms outlawed the
shipment of concealable firearms by way of the United States Postal Service.6
Then in the 1930s, congressional action initiated a wave of new legislation,
including the National Firearms Act of 19347 and the Federal Firearms Act of
1938.8  The National Firearms Act dealt largely with licensing and taxation
regulations.9  The Federal Firearms Act of 1938 extended that regulatory
scheme: in addition to expanding the scope of licensing provisions for deal-
ers and manufacturers operating in interstate commerce, the 1938 Act, for
the first time, criminalized the possession of firearms (that had been shipped
in interstate commerce) by individuals who had been convicted of “crime[s]
of violence.”10  And thus began the federal firearms ban against individuals
who had “violen[t]” criminal histories11—a statutory scheme that continues
on robustly today.
Congress enacted a second wave of gun control regulation in the 1960s,
in part, as a response to the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy,
Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King Jr.12  Just over two months after
King was fatally shot, President Johnson signed the Omnibus Crime Control
4 David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act: A Historical and Legal Perspective,
17 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 589–90 (1987).
5 Id. at 590.
6 Id. at 589–90 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1715 (1982)).
7 National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934); see also History of
Gun-Control Legislation, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/history-of-gun-control-legislation/2012/12/22/80c8d624-4ad3-11e2-9a42-d1ce
6d0ed278_story.html?utm_term=.eb1c4d2a05ad (“Spurred by the bloody ‘Tommy gun’ era
ushered in by Al Capone, John Dillinger, Baby Face Nelson, Pretty Boy Floyd, and Bonnie
and Clyde . . . Roosevelt mount[ed] a ‘New Deal for Crime.’”).
8 Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938).
9 See generally 48 Stat. 1236.
10 § 2, 52 Stat. at 1251.
11 Id.
12 See Hardy, supra note 4, at 601–02; see also History of Gun-Control Legislation, supra
note 7.
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and Safe Streets Act of 1968 into law.13  The Act’s congressional findings
note that the “ease with which [criminals] can acquire firearms . . . is a signifi-
cant factor in the prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United
States.”14  The Act made it “unlawful for any person who is under indictment
or who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year” from shipping, transporting, or receiv-
ing any firearm or ammunition that has been shipped via interstate or
foreign commerce.15
The felon-in-possession ban remains part of the U.S. Code today.  As
presently codified, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) makes it “unlawful for any person
who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm that has “been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”16
B. Exceptions to the Federal Firearms Ban
Section 922(g)(1) does not exist without exceptions.  These exemptions
can be divided into three categories: (1) type of firearm, (2) type of offense,
and (3) type of offender.
The first exception—type of firearm—is a narrow one.  For purposes of
the ban, antique firearms are not considered “firearms” within the meaning
of the Act.17  In other words, individuals who would otherwise be banned
from possessing a firearm may possess antique firearms, so long as the gun
was manufactured in or before 1898, or serves as a replica thereof.18
The second type of exception exempts certain offenses from triggering
the firearm ban.  Section 922(g)(1) does not apply to “offenses relating to
the regulation of business practices” like “antitrust violations” and “unfair
trade practices.”19  Additionally, misdemeanor state offenses punishable by a
term of imprisonment of two years or less do not implicate the § 922(g)(1)
ban on firearm possession.20  Taken together, the felon-in-possession ban
13 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197.
14 § 901, 82 Stat. at 225.
15 § 922(e)–(f), 82 Stat. at 230–31.  Commonplace in the United States is a distinction
between two categories of crimes: misdemeanors and felonies—felonies being those with
the possibility of punishment by death or imprisonment exceeding one year.  1 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.6(a) (2d ed. 2003).
16 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (9) (2012).  Misdemeanor convictions for crimes of domestic
violence, notwithstanding the potential sentence length, are also covered under the ban.
Id. § 922(g)(9).  Additionally, any state misdemeanor offense (notwithstanding whether it
is related to domestic violence) with a potential sentence of two years or more activates the
firearm prohibition for the convicted individual. Id. § 921(a)(20)(B).
17 Id. § 921(a)(3), (16).
18 Id.
19 Id. § 921(a)(20)(A).
20 Id. § 921(a)(20)(B).  However, § 922(g)(9) maintains that the ban still applies to
those who have been “convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
lence” regardless of the potential sentence to be imposed. Id. § 922(g)(9).
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applies to individuals convicted of: (1) any (state or federal) felony punisha-
ble by a term exceeding one year or (2) any misdemeanor punishable by a
term exceeding two years.
Finally, the third type of exception relates to the offender.  Section
921(a)(20) provides that individuals who have a qualifying conviction are
excluded from the ban if: (1) they were pardoned, (2) their civil rights were
restored, or (3) their conviction was expunged.21  This exception, however,
does not apply where the “pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil
rights expressly provides that the person may not . . . possess . . . firearms.”22
The statutory scheme also leaves open the possibility for any disabled individ-
ual to seek administrative relief.  The discretionary exception in 18 U.S.C.
§ 925 authorizes the Attorney General to grant firearm-disability relief.23
C. Administrative Relief from Federal Firearm Disability
Pursuant to the statutory scheme thus far discussed in Part I, Congress
expressly codified an administrative route for seeking firearm-disability
relief.24  In particular, § 925(c) provides that where a person is prohibited
from possessing a firearm because of § 922(g) restrictions, that person may
seek relief from the Attorney General.25  The Attorney General subsequently
transferred that authority to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF).26  When considering whether to grant relief, Congress out-
lined various factors to evaluate.  These factors include (1) the “applicant’s
record and reputation,” (2) whether the applicant is “likely to act in a man-
ner dangerous to public safety,” and (3) whether providing relief to an appli-
cant would be “contrary to the public interest.”27
21 See id. § 921(a)(20).
22 Id.  The Supreme Court held that for the purposes of the civil rights restoration
exception, this does not cover offenders whose civil rights were never stripped in the first
place—i.e., if a defendant never lost his civil rights, those rights cannot be “restored,” and
the ban would still apply. See Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 26–27 (2007).  Civil
rights, although not defined in § 921(a)(20), include the right to (1) vote, (2) hold public
office, and (3) serve on a jury. Id. at 28 (citing Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 316
(1998)).
23 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
24 See id.
25 Id. (“A person who is prohibited from possessing . . . firearms or ammunition may
make application to the Attorney General for relief from the disabilities imposed by Fed-
eral laws with respect to . . . possession of firearms, and the Attorney General may grant
such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the disabil-
ity, and the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely
to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not
be contrary to the public interest.”).
26 27 C.F.R. § 178.144 (1996).
27 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).  A 2014 draft of ATF’s Application for Restoration of Firearms
Privileges consists of a four-page application requiring the applicant to provide a host of
information. Application for Restoration of Firearms Privileges, ATF Form 3210.1, BUREAU OF
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES (Sept. 2014), https://www.atf.gov/file/
115766/download.  The relevant form requires the applicant to provide information on
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Section 925(c) further provides individuals the opportunity to file a peti-
tion for review in a federal district court if administrative relief is denied.28
District courts, at their discretion, may “admit additional evidence where fail-
ure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.”29
Congress, however, has blockaded this route to relief for more than a
quarter of a century.  Since 1992, the disability-relief provision in § 925(c)
has been “rendered inoperative”30 by Congress’s refusal to appropriate funds
for the ATF to “investigate or act upon [relief] applications.”31  A Senate
Committee Report advanced two reasons justifying cutting off appropria-
tions: first, members of Congress feared the potential harmful consequences
of restoring gun rights to violent individuals, and second, the laborious task
of conducting the investigations consumed “approximately 40 man-years”
each year.32
The § 925(c) appropriations ban continues to this day.33  The ATF’s
website notifies visitors that individuals “convicted of Federal offenses [and
seeking relief] must apply for a Presidential Pardon” through the Depart-
topics including, but not limited to: (1) identification verification, (2) residency, (3)
employment history, (4) arrest and conviction records, (5) parole and probation officer
contact information, (6) character references, and (7) a variety of yes/no questions related
to other restrictions in § 922(g). Id.  Due to an appropriations ban for this program, the
ATF website currently advises visitors with federal convictions to “apply for a Presidential
Pardon via . . . the Department of Justice.” ATF Form F 3210.1—No Longer Available, BUREAU
OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/
form/application-restoration-firearms-privileges-atf-form-32101/download (last visited Feb.
20, 2018).
28 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
29 Id.  Presumably, additional evidence requested by the court could either be aggra-
vating information in opposition to lifting the disability, or evidence in support of the
applicant’s upstanding character.
30 Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1 (2007).
31 Id. (quoting United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74–75 (2002)).
32 S. REP. NO. 102-353, at 19–20 (1992).  The corresponding House Committee Report
noted similar concerns.  In particular, the House Committee “believe[d] that the $3.75
million and 40 man-years annually spent investigating and acting upon these applications
for relief would be better utilized by [the] ATF in fighting violent crime.” H.R. REP. NO.
102-618, at 14 (1992).
33 WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44189, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO,
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES (ATF): FY2016 APPROPRIATIONS 15 (2015).  When the ATF’s relief
program was in effect, the Agency from 1968 to 1982 processed 22,969 applications—and
of those applications, 7581 individuals’ firearms rights were restored. Id. Interestingly,
Congress has continued to provide appropriations to accommodate administrative relief
for corporations convicted of qualifying crimes. See Granting of Relief; Federal Firearms
Privileges, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,134 (Aug. 17, 2017) (granting firearm relief to Action Manufac-
turing Company).  “[S]ince 1993 Congress has authorized ATF to expend appropriated
funds to investigate and act upon applications filed by corporations for relief from Federal
firearms disabilities.” Id.
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ment of Justice.34  In light of this administrative impasse, individuals have
understandably turned to the courts for relief.35
II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE:
ESTABLISHING AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT
Congress constructed the regulatory scheme discussed in Part I decades
before the Supreme Court decided its landmark Second Amendment cases.
Not until 2008 did the Supreme Court settle the following question: Does the
Second Amendment provide a constitutional protection for the individual
unconnected with service in the militia?  In District of Columbia v. Heller,36 the
Supreme Court’s 5–4 majority opinion answered that question in the affirma-
tive.  Although Heller, and subsequently, McDonald v. City of Chicago, helped
to define the scope of the Second Amendment, language in both decisions
has sparked questions relating to the constitutionality of the federal firearm
regulatory regime.
A. Establishing an Individual Right: District of Columbia v. Heller
Heller involved a challenge to a District of Columbia statutory scheme
that “generally prohibit[ed] the possession of handguns” by making it a
crime to carry unregistered firearms, while also prohibiting the registration
of handguns.37  Dick Heller was a D.C. special police offer who challenged
the firearm prohibition after the District of Columbia refused to grant him a
registration certificate to keep a handgun at home.38  At issue in the case was
whether the Second Amendment afforded an individual right, or if the text
of the amendment applied “only . . . in connection with militia service.”39
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the “Second Amendment
confer[s] an individual right to keep and bear arms”40 unconnected to mili-
tia service.41  “[A]t the core of the Second Amendment is ‘the right of law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.’”42
That constitutional guarantee, though, ought not to be construed as an
unlimited liberty: “[W]e do not read the Second Amendment to protect the
right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation.”43  What, though,
were the parameters the Court had in mind?  Justice Scalia surveyed the
potential limits to the Second Amendment.  Appealing to the historical prac-
tices that permitted firearms regulations, Scalia wrote: “From Blackstone
34 ATF Form F 3210.1—No Longer Available, supra note 27.
35 See infra Part III.
36 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
37 Id. at 574–75.
38 Id. at 575.
39 Id. at 577.
40 Id. at 595 (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 610 (citing Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 24 (1820)).
42 Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at
635).
43 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
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through the 19th-century cases,” the right to keep and bear arms had not
been construed so broadly as to apply to any manner and any purpose.44
Most relevant to this Note is Scalia’s next assurance:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the
full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms
by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.45
Because Heller addressed a Second Amendment challenge in the context
of District of Columbia’s statutory code, the question remaining after Heller
was how its holding affected the states.
B. A Case of Incorporation: McDonald v. City of Chicago
Just two years after Heller, the Supreme Court heard another Second
Amendment challenge to a firearms regulation scheme—not unlike that
which was presented in Heller. McDonald v. City of Chicago46 involved a chal-
lenge to firearms regulations in Chicago and the nearby municipality of Oak
Park, Illinois.47  This time, the question before the Court was whether the
Second Amendment should be incorporated to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment.48  In another 5–4 divided decision, the slim majority
incorporated the Second Amendment and struck down the regulations.49
Justice Alito, writing the opinion for the Court, held that the “Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment
right recognized in Heller.”50  Post-McDonald, the Second Amendment’s pro-
tection of the individual right to keep and bear arms applies equally to both
federal and state action.
Like in Heller, the McDonald majority cast no doubt on the legality of
longstanding regulations for gun control, and “repeat[ed] those assurances”
in its opinion.51  The McDonald Court included language confirming that
regulations keeping felons from firearm possession were presumptively con-
stitutional, noting that “incorporation [of the Second Amendment did] not
imperil every law regulating firearms.”52
Neither Heller nor McDonald seems to seriously question the constitu-
tionality of the felon-in-possession ban—largely because of Justice Scalia’s
dicta assuring that such a prohibition was presumptively lawful.53  Neverthe-
44 Id. at 626.
45 Id. at 626–27 (emphasis added).
46 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
47 Id. at 750.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 791.
51 Id. at 786; see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
52 Id. at 786.
53 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
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less, litigants have challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
At the federal appellate level, nearly every circuit has rejected a facial chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).54  What is less certain, however,
is how courts should address as-applied attacks on § 922(g)(1).
Courts of appeals continue to grapple with the interplay between federal
firearms regulations and the individual right declared in Heller.  This Note by
no means intends to survey all the various developments of Second Amend-
ment jurisprudence in our post-Heller state.  Rather, Part III of this Note will
explore, specifically, a current circuit split: whether individuals barred from
firearm possession pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) may successfully chal-
lenge their disability to firearm possession on an as-applied basis.
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT: A DIVIDE IN COURTS’ APPROACHES
TO AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES
Although Heller and McDonald made clear that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right, the scope of the protection percolates as an
unresolved legal issue in the lower courts.  As mentioned above, there is no
serious doubt that the felon-in-possession ban, on its face, is constitutionally
valid,55 but circuit courts remain unreconciled as to whether individuals can
successfully challenge this prohibition on an as-applied basis.  This Part will
survey the appellate courts’ decisions and examine the arguments proffered
for, and against, entertaining as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1).  In partic-
ular, this Note will give considerable attention to a recent Third Circuit deci-
sion, Binderup v. Attorney General, the first case of its kind to restore firearm
privileges through the use of a § 922(g)(1) as-applied challenge.56
54 In United States v. Bogle, the per curiam decision rejected a facial challenge to
§ 922(g)(1), noting that its opinion would “join every other circuit to consider the issue in
affirming that § 922(g)(1) is a constitutional restriction.”  717 F.3d 281, 281–82 (2d Cir.
2013) (per curiam); see also Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United
States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581 (8th Cir.
2011); United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Williams, 616
F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111
(9th Cir. 2010); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Anderson, 559 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2009).  The unanimity of the circuit court decisions lends
formidable support to the argument that the felon-in-possession ban, on its face, poses no
serious affront to the Second Amendment.
55 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
56 Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Sessions v.
Binderup, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017); see also Eugene Volokh, Can Some People Who Have Fin-
ished Their Felony Sentences Recover Their Second Amendment Rights?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CON-
SPIRACY (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2016/09/07/can-some-people-who-have-finished-their-felony-sentences-recover-their-sec-
ond-amendment-rights/?utm_term=.c9a1e8ea1b3d.
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A. Circuit Courts Refusing to Entertain § 922(g)(1) As-Applied Challenges
Not all circuit courts have offered a warm welcome to the possibility of
striking down the felon-in-possession ban on an as-applied basis.  As high-
lighted in a note on this topic, multiple circuits have seemingly issued
“[p]remature foreclosure[s]”57 to the feasibility of these challenges, either
expressly or impliedly.58  More specifically, five circuit courts have held that
§ 922(g)(1) passes constitutional muster in all circumstances, regardless of
the crime committed or circumstances involved.59
1. Fourth Circuit: Hamilton v. Pallozzi
Of the five circuits rejecting as-applied challenges to the felon-in-posses-
sion ban, the Fourth Circuit’s decision60 is most recent.  Appellant Hamilton
was a convicted felon who had pleaded guilty to three Virginia felonies:
credit card theft, credit card forgery, and credit card fraud.61  Although the
Fourth Circuit had previously left open the door for the possibility of as-
applied challenges for felon disarmament statutes,62 the Hamilton court
closed that opportunity in its totality for any challenge predicated on a felony
conviction.63  Judge Floyd, who wrote the opinion for the three-judge panel,
held: “[W]e simply hold that conviction of a felony necessarily removes one
from the class of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ for the purposes of the
Second Amendment,”64 thereby removing the potential for any felon to
restore his firearm right via litigation.
2. Fifth Circuit: United States v. Scroggins
In United States v. Scroggins, Scroggins argued that § 922(g)(1) violated
his Second Amendment rights under Heller because his predicate criminal
57 Alexander C. Barrett, Note, Taking Aim at Felony Possession, 93 B.U. L. REV. 163,
183–85 (2013).
58 See id. at 183.
59 Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 500
(2017) (mem.); United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010); Rozier, 598
F.3d at 772; Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1118; McCane, 573 F.3d at 1047; see also THOMAS M. KECK,
JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES 91 (2014).
60 Hamilton, 848 F.3d 614.
61 Id. at 618.
62 Id. at 622–23.
63 Id. at 626.
64 Id.  Nevertheless, the language in Hamilton, perhaps, does not go so far as to hold
that misdemeanants with a sentencing possibility of two years or more would also be pre-
cluded from as-applied challenges.  The language of the holding applies specifically to
“state law felon[s].” Id. at 629.  Not surprisingly, gun-rights activist groups took issue with
the outcome in Hamilton. See, e.g., A Fourth Circuit Trifecta: New Rulings Confirm Need for
Judges Who Respect Second Amendment, NRA-ILA (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.nraila.org/
articles/20170224/a-fourth-circuit-trifecta-new-rulings-confirm-need-for-judges-who-re
spect-second-amendment.
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conviction showed no violent intent.65  In rejecting this claim, Judge Elrod,
like Judge Floyd in the Fourth Circuit, held that “criminal prohibitions on
felons (violent or nonviolent) possessing firearms [do] not violate” the Sec-
ond Amendment.66  This holding thereby precludes felons, even nonviolent
ones, from having their firearms privileges restored in the Fifth Circuit.
3. Ninth Circuit: United States v. Vongxay
In the Ninth Circuit, the court in United States v. Vongxay rejected the
defendant’s claim that § 922(g)(1), as applicable to him, violated his Second
Amendment right.67  Vongxay’s criminal history involved three nonviolent
convictions: two car burglary convictions and one drug possession viola-
tion.68 Vongxay appears to leave no room open for as-applied challenges for
people like the defendant: “[F]elons are categorically different from the indi-
viduals who have a fundamental right to bear arms.”69
4. Tenth Circuit: United States v. McCane
United States v. McCane involved an appeal by a defendant convicted of
unlawfully possessing a firearm because of his felon status.70  In McCane, the
majority quickly disposed of the § 922(g)(1) challenge by citing the proposi-
tion in Heller that states “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons.”71  Legal commentary has critiqued the McCane analysis as making a
“short work” out of a conceivable constitutional inquiry.72
5. Eleventh Circuit: United States v. Rozier
Lastly, United States v. Rozier73 most explicitly rejects § 922(g)(1) as-
applied challenges by felons.  In Rozier, the defendant had multiple federal
narcotics convictions on his record, and on direct appeal for his conviction
for possessing a firearm, he challenged the constitutionality of the felon-in-
possession ban.74  In affirming the district court’s decision, the three-judge
65 United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010).
66 Id.
67 United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010).
68 Id. at 1114.
69 Id. at 1115.  Professor William Merkel considers this decision to result from an
application of the rational basis test for the Second Amendment. See William G. Merkel,
Uncoupling the Constitutional Right to Self-Defense from the Second Amendment: Insights from the
Law of War, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1809, 1820 n.33 (2013).
70 United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1040 (10th Cir. 2009).
71 Id. at 1047 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)).
72 Stephen C. Mouritsen, Note, United States v. McCane: Judge Tymkovich Questions
Heller’s Disarming Dicta, 2010 BYU L. REV. 183, 191 (noting that “[t]he court likewise made
short work of McCane’s invitation to call into question the validity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)”
and “merely responded by recapitulating the Heller dictum”).
73 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010).
74 Id. at 769–70.
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panel proffered decisive language suggesting that no felon could ever over-
come the statutory prohibition of firearm possession: the language in Heller
“suggests that statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under
any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.”75
B. Circuit Courts Considering § 922(g)(1) As-Applied Challenges
Not all courts of appeals have so adamantly foreclosed the opportunity
for felons to challenge their firearm-possession disability.  Indeed, in more
recent years, several circuits have asserted the proposition that, in some cases,
as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) might comport with Second Amend-
ment liberties.  This Section provides an overview of these circuit courts’
approaches.
1. The D.C. Circuit: Schrader v. Holder
The D.C. Circuit in Schrader v. Holder76 left open the possibility for suc-
cessful as-applied challenges in future cases.  Judge Tatel wrote for the three-
judge panel including himself, Judge Williams, and Judge Randolph.77
Schrader had been convicted of Maryland common-law misdemeanors of
assault and battery in 1968.78  On appeal, Schrader challenged the constitu-
tionality of § 922(g)(1)’s application against the class of common-law misde-
meanants.79  The court applied an intermediate-scrutiny review of the
firearm ban, but ultimately upheld § 922(g)(1) on its face.80
Judge Tatel, however, took notice that sprinkled throughout Schrader’s
brief appeared to be an argument that the felon-in-possession ban, as applied
to Schrader individually, would fail constitutional muster.81  Ultimately, the
three-judge panel refused to rule on this argument because it was not
brought before the district court, but nevertheless, Judge Tatel’s dictum indi-
cates that the D.C. Circuit might be willing, in future cases, to entertain as-
applied challenges:
Were this argument properly before us, Heller might well dictate [another]
outcome.  According to the complaint’s allegations, Schrader’s offense
occurred over forty years ago and involved only a fistfight.  Schrader
received no jail time, served honorably in Vietnam, and, except for a single
traffic violation, has had no encounter with the law since then.  To the
extent that these allegations are true, we would hesitate to find Schrader
outside the class of “law-abiding, responsible citizens” whose possession of
firearms is, under Heller, protected by the Second Amendment.82
75 Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
76 704 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
77 Id. at 982.
78 Id. at 983.
79 Id. at 983–84.
80 Id. at 988–91.
81 Id. at 991.
82 Id. at 991 (citations omitted) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
635 (2008)).
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Judge Tatel’s dicta alludes to several relevant factors to consider for indi-
vidual as-applied challenges: (1) time between the offense and the challenge,
(2) severity of offense, (3) sentence imposed, (4) recidivism, and (5) military
service, or more broadly construed, evidence of civic engagement.83
Although this issue was not decided by the court, Judge Tatel seems to sug-
gest that, taken in the totality, these factors would be relevant when deter-
mining whether an individual could successfully challenge § 922(g)(1).
2. The Seventh Circuit: Potential for Nonviolent Felons
The Seventh Circuit has also acknowledged the possibility for felons to
successfully challenge the felon-in-possession ban on an individual basis.84  In
United States v. Williams, Judge Kanne put forward a framework to analyze as-
applied challenges by adopting the intermediate-scrutiny standard of
review.85  In Williams, the underlying facts of the case involved a robbery con-
viction resulting from a crime so violent that it required the victim to receive
sixty-five stitches.86  Because of the crime’s violent nature, the court rejected
Williams’s as-applied challenge.87  However, the court left open the possibil-
ity of success for future plaintiffs, noting that “§ 922(g)(1) may be subject to
an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its disqualification of all
felons, including those who are non-violent.”88
Litigants have taken note of the Williams decision.  Most recently in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, a judge granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of a plaintiff’s as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1).89
Mr. Hatfield was convicted twenty-eight years ago for lying on forms he sub-
mitted pursuant to the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act.  He received
no jail time for the offense and in the meantime has maintained a spotless
record.90  The court in Hatfield v. Sessions applied a two-part test to resolve
the case.  First, the court concluded that people like Hatfield—felons con-
victed of nonviolent offenses—are not “categorically unprotected by the Sec-
ond Amendment.”91  Second, the court applied a level of scrutiny
somewhere between strict and intermediate scrutiny.  In doing so, the court
concluded that the government lacked an “extremely strong” interest in
prohibiting gun ownership from the class of “non-violent felons who received
no prison time and a small monetary fine.”92  Professor Eugene Volokh com-
mented at an earlier stage in this litigation that if this case is appealed to the
83 See id.
84 See Baer v. Lynch, 636 F. App’x 695, 697 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Williams,
616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2010).
85 Williams, 616 F.3d at 692–93.
86 Id. at 693.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Hatfield v. Sessions, No. 16-cv-00383, 2018 WL 1963876 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2018).
90 Id. at *1.
91 Id. at *3–5.
92 Id. at *5–7.
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Seventh Circuit, it will give the court a “chance to squarely opine on the
issue,”93 since the court has not taken on a case with a past conviction like
this before.
3. Success in the Third Circuit: Binderup v. Attorney General
Binderup v. Attorney General94 is a recent appellate decision on an as-
applied challenge of § 922(g)(1)—and is, perhaps, the most significant case
thus far because of its outcome. Binderup involved two individuals who chal-
lenged § 922(g)(1) on an as-applied basis.95  The first challenger, Daniel
Binderup, pled guilty in 1998 in a Pennsylvania state court to the offense of
corrupting a minor after having a consensual sexual relationship with a sev-
enteen-year-old.96  Corrupting a minor was a misdemeanor offense in Penn-
sylvania that carried the possibility of five-years imprisonment.97  Binderup,
however, received no jail time—he was sentenced to three years of probation
and was issued a $300 fine.98  Since that run-in with the law, Binderup had no
other criminal offenses on his record.99
The second individual in the Binderup decision was Julio Suarez, who
pleaded guilty in 1990 for the unlawful carrying of a handgun without a
license—a misdemeanor subject to up to three years imprisonment.100
(Recall that because the misdemeanor carries a potential sentence of more
than two years, the felon-in-possession ban applies.)  The only other blemish
on Suarez’s record was a state-law misdemeanor offense for driving while
under the influence of alcohol.101
Both men sought relief from the firearm disability in federal district
court on two grounds: (1) as a matter of statutory construction § 922(g)(1)
did not apply to them, and (2) the statute, as applied to them, violated the
Second Amendment.102  The district court concluded that § 922(g)(1)
93 Eugene Volokh, Second Amendment Claim of Felon with 25-Year-Old False Statements Con-
viction May Go Forward, WASH. POST.: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 21, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/21/second-amendment-
claim-of-felon-with-25-year-old-false-statements-conviction-may-go-forward/?utm_term=.a95
545f56072 (noting that the Seventh Circuit “hasn’t directly resolved the question, or fur-
ther defined which felons can indeed rebut the presumption.”).
94 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct.
2323 (2017) (mem.).
95 See id. at 340.
96 Id.
97 Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6301(a)(1)(i), 1104).  Although the crime was only
a misdemeanor, the potential for a five-year sentence activated § 922(g)(1) through the
exception in § 921(a)(20)(B).
98 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 340.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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applied as a matter of statutory construction, but that it nevertheless was
unconstitutional as applied to both Binderup and Suarez.103
Consistent with the district court, the Third Circuit en banc decision
rejected the statutory interpretation argument104 and focused on the as-
applied constitutional challenge.  Drawing from its own precedent, the
Binderup Court presented a two-step framework for as-applied challenges to
presumptively lawful firearms regulations.105  First, the challenger must
prove that the firearm regulation burdened his Second Amendment right.
To do this, the challenger must (a) “identify the traditional justifications for
excluding from Second Amendment protections the class of which he
appears to be a member”106 and (b) present facts that distinguish the chal-
lenger from the class of barred individuals—i.e., prove the crime was not
“serious.”107  If the challenger overcomes the first part of the test, the court
moves to consider whether the felon-in-possession ban survives heightened
scrutiny on an as-applied basis.108
Part one of the test was satisfied, the court held, because of the Heller
pronouncement that “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire-
arms by felons” are “presumptively lawful.”109  The traditional concept of a
“felon” is codified in § 922(g)(1) through its ban on anyone committing an
offense, either state or federal, that is subject to greater than two years of
imprisonment.  Such was the case for both Binderup and Suarez—thus both
men were subject to a presumptively lawful firearm ban.110  The court
pointed to historical arguments made that individuals committing felonies—
deemed a “serious crime” by the state—lack virtue, and virtue is a quality that
has been (even before the founding of the republic) tied to the right to bear
arms.111
Having established that § 922(g)(1) is a presumptively lawful firearm
regulation, the majority next questioned whether the challengers’ crimes
were “serious enough” to strip away their Second Amendment rights.112
Answer: no.113  The crimes were deemed not “serious enough” for four rea-
sons: (1) the offenses were classified as misdemeanors rather than felonies,
(2) the crimes lacked violence, (3) the judge imposed a minor sentence, and
103 Id. at 340–41.
104 Id. at 341–42.
105 Id. at 345–47.
106 Id. at 347.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 353.
109 Id. at 347 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008)).
110 Id. at 348.
111 Id. at 348–49.  The stripping of the right to bear arms is not unlike other civil rights
taken from individuals convicted of crimes.  For example, voting rights are often stripped
from individuals who have committed felonies. See James A. Stout, Note, Civil Consequences
of Conviction for a Felony, 12 DRAKE L. REV. 141 (1963) (surveying various civil rights the state
strips upon conviction of a felony both by state and federal law).
112 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 351 (emphasis added).
113 Id.
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(4) there was no cross-jurisdictional consensus about the seriousness of the
offense.114
In conclusion, the Binderup court, in applying intermediate scrutiny,
determined that the government failed to provide any “meaningful evidence”
to justify its prediction that Binderup and Suarez were likely to misuse fire-
arms or be irresponsible citizens.115  Because the government failed to meet
its burden, the court’s holding restored Binderup’s and Suarez’s Second
Amendment rights.
The decision in Binderup is significant.  Most remarkably, this is the first
outcome known to restore a petitioner’s Second Amendment rights based on
a §922(g)(1) challenge.
C. Solicitor General Appeals the Binderup Decision
The Obama administration initially sought a writ of certiorari in the
Binderup decision, but the Trump administration continued the appeal once
President Trump took office.116  This course of action seemed to contradict
the rhetoric of the administration and its support for gun rights.  For exam-
ple, at a speech to the National Rifle Association, President Trump declared
that “[t]he eight-year assault on your Second Amendment freedoms has
come to a crashing end,” and that he would “never, ever infringe on the right
of the people to keep and bear arms.”117  Such was not the tone in the Solici-
tor General’s petition to the Supreme Court.  The Solicitor General’s peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari cited two main factors warranting review and
reversal by the Supreme Court: (1) the threat to public safety and (2) the
challenge the judicial branch faces with ad hoc assessments of whether or not
to restore firearm privileges.118
114 Id. at 351–53.
115 Id. at 354.  The Court determined that the government’s proffered evidence—i.e.,
statistical studies—were not on point for Binderup’s and Suarez’s circumstances; this con-
clusion was furthered by the fact that the offenses were twenty and twenty-six years old,
suggesting that the recidivism studies may be irrelevant to the facts at hand. Id.
116 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (No.
16-847), 2017 WL 83637; Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Binderup, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (No. 16-
847), 2017 WL 1353289; see also David G. Savage, Trump Administration Asks Supreme Court to
Reject 2nd Amendment Claim by Men Who Lost Gun Rights Over Nonviolent Crimes, L.A. TIMES
(May 25, 2017), http://beta.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-court-guns-trump-20170525-
story.html.
117 Ali Vitali, Trump to NRA: ‘Eight-Year Assault’ on Gun Rights Is Over, NBC NEWS (Apr.
28, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-nra-eight-year-assault-
gun-rights-over-n752446.  Following the horrific and deadly school shooting that took
place in Parkland, Florida, in February 2018, commentators suggested that President
Trump is maintaining his allegiance with the NRA. See Michael D. Shear & Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Conceding to N.R.A., Trump Abandons Brief Gun Control Promise, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/12/us/politics/trump-gun-control-nation
al-rifle-association.html (“President Trump . . . abandoned his promise to work for gun
control measures opposed by the National Rifle Association.”).
118 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 114.
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The Supreme Court, however, denied the petition in a 7–2 decision.119
Why the Court decided not to hear the case is beyond knowing; no judicial
reasoning was attached to the denial of certiorari.120  As the Court has time
and again noted, however, “the denial of certiorari ‘imports no expression of
opinion upon the merits of a case.’”121  To that end, the Court’s denial to
review the Binderup decision reflects only that a sufficient number of Justices
were unwilling to hear the case, for whatever reason, but does not advance an
implicit acceptance or rejection by the Court of Binderup’s holding.  This
issue, then, will continue to be ventilated among the circuit courts, but the
Supreme Court should grant certiorari in a future case to bring uniformity to
this issue of such national importance.
One possible reason Binderup did not generate enough interest in the
highest court relates to the criminal offense at issue in Binderup.  Unlike most
of the cases previously discussed involving violent crimes, Binderup involved
misdemeanor offenses—not felonies.  As such, the Court might have inter-
preted Binderup as not striking at the heart of the circuit split.  But no doubt
remains that uncertainty of application permeates the lower courts.
IV. THE CASE FOR PERMITTING AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES TO § 922(G)(1)
Part IV of this Note will examine the rationale for permitting petitioners
to advance as-applied challenges through the federal court system.  For rea-
sons discussed below, this Note advocates for the continued consideration of
as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) for convicted felons.  First, Second
Amendment jurisprudence, in both Heller and McDonald, suggests that the
validity of firearm regulations rests only on a presumption of its lawfulness.
Second, in the absence of any administrative remedy, the foreclosure of as-
applied challenges leaves plaintiffs with no realistic form of redress to chal-
lenge the felon-in-possession ban.
A. Textual Justification: Heller’s Presumption Invites a Rebuttal
Starting with the text of Heller and McDonald, the Court’s plain language
fails to assert as impenetrable any challenge to the felon-in-possession ban.
The text of Heller states that “presumptively lawful regulatory measures,”
including bans on firearm ownership by convicted felons and the mentally ill,
should not be doubted.122  Presumptions, however, are not wholly
insurmountable.123
119 Binderup, 137 S. Ct. 2323.  Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor would have granted the
petition for certiorari.  Id.
120 Id.
121 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 456 (1953) (citing House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 48
(1945)).
122 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 n.26 (2008) (emphasis added).
123 A presumption is “[s]omething that is thought to be true because it is highly proba-
ble.” Presumption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Nevertheless, presumptions
“shift[ ] the burden . . . to the opposing party, who can then attempt to overcome the
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Taking the text on its face, albeit dicta, Justice Scalia’s use of the term
“presumptively” ought not to go unnoticed.  Scalia—a Justice famous for his
consultations with the dictionary124—unlikely inserted the term “presump-
tively” without due care.  By using such a term, gun regulations against classes
of people like felons and the mentally ill may be constitutional on their face,
but this need not assume that every scenario will pass constitutional muster.
The Hatfield court put it well, stating that Heller’s reference to “felon disarma-
ment bans only as ‘presumptively lawful’ . . . means that there must exist the
possibility that the ban could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied
challenge.”125
Just how strong is the presumption described by Justice Scalia?  To over-
come a challenge to a Second Amendment restriction, must the law pass
rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny, or some varying level of
heightened scrutiny? Heller forecloses the use of rational basis review for fire-
arms regulations.126  Recent scholarship has debated whether intermediate
or strict scrutiny applies; though no absolute consensus has emerged, courts
tend to evaluate Second Amendment claims under intermediate scrutiny.127
The “presumptively lawful” language provides a safe harbor that pre-
cludes facial invalidation of the felon-in-possession prohibition, but it leaves
presumption.” Id.; see also Presumptively, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/presumptively (last visited Oct. 30, 2017) (defining presumptive as
“giving grounds for reasonable opinion or belief”).
124 See, e.g., William Safire, On Language; Scalia v. Merriam-Webster, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20,
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/20/magazine/on-language-scalia-v-merriam-
webster.html (discussing Justice Scalia’s use of the dictionary in MCI v. AT&T to discern
the meaning of “modify”).
125 Hatfield v. Lynch, No. 16-cv-00383, 2016 WL 7373768, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2016)
(citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26).
126 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep
and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the
separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”); see also
Benjamin A. Ellis, Note, “Time Enough” for Scrutiny: The Second Amendment, Mental Health,
and the Case for Intermediate Scrutiny, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1325, 1336 (2017) (“The
[Heller] Court did rule out rational basis, however, which leaves intermediate scrutiny and
the more demanding standard of strict scrutiny.”).
127 See Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 947 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); see also David T. Hardy, The Right to Arms and Standards of Review: A
Tale of Three Circuits, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1435 (2014) (arguing for the application of varying
levels of scrutiny depending on the context); Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradi-
tion: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852 (2013)
(advocating for the adoption of the Seventh Amendment’s “historical test” to be applied in
Second Amendment claims); Allen Rostron, The Continuing Battle Over the Second Amend-
ment, 78 ALB. L. REV. 819, 824–25 (2015) (noting that in the absence of Heller declaring a
level of scrutiny to apply, courts tend to choose between intermediate and strict scrutiny).
Other scholars, however, would do away with the scrutiny approach and adopt an entirely
different analytical framework.  For example, Professor Sobel advocates for the use of the
undue burden test as the test for courts to analyze Second Amendment claims.  Stacey L.
Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to Do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489 (2012).
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open the door for particularized challenges to the law.128  Thus, while the
language of Heller poses no challenge to § 922(g)(1) on its face, the govern-
ment will still have to justify the law’s application on an individual basis.
B. The Judiciary as the Avenue for Relief
A second reason for courts to entertain as-applied challenges is that the
federal government offers no other adequate form of relief.  Since 1992, no
congressional appropriations have been permitted to fund 18 U.S.C.
§ 925(c)—the provision of the U.S. Code that created an administrative pro-
cess for those seeking to restore their Second Amendment rights.129  Without
this administrative remedy and without courts considering as-applied chal-
lenges, litigants would lack a realistic avenue for relief.130
Even though courts might not be best equipped to handle a potential
flood of cases seeking to restore firearm privileges, providing a judicial forum
for relief is preferred, as opposed to blockading all options of vindicating
one’s constitutional right.  The ATF, compared to Article III courts, is in a
much better position to execute a gun-possession restoration program than
the judiciary for multiple reasons.  First, like other administrative agencies,
ATF specializes in firearms.131  Whereas federal courts must be generalists
and hear different types of cases within their Article III jurisdiction, a division
of the ATF could focus exclusively on firearm restoration applications.  Sec-
ond, an application process with the ATF would be centralized.  Not only
would all applications be reviewed by the same department (as opposed to
hundreds of district court judges), but the ATF would develop expertise in
reviewing petitions with similar (or different) facts under an identical frame-
work.  Third and finally, Congress would have the opportunity to exert more
control over the petition process if it remained with the ATF, rather than
abdicating all authority to the judiciary to create an ad hoc patchwork of
legal frameworks that vary among the circuits.
Nevertheless, because the appropriations ban precludes the ATF from
executing the § 925(c) relief provision, the judiciary ought to hear cases
involving as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1).  This is not a novel job for the
128 See Barrett, supra note 57, at 192–94.
129 See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
130 To be sure, the ATF does direct individuals seeking relief to seek a presidential
pardon as an alternative remedy. See supra note 27.  However, statistics confirm the likeli-
hood of restoring one’s civil rights through a pardon is unlikely. See Clemency Statistics, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-statistics (last updated Mar. 2,
2018).  For example, during President Obama’s tenure, only 212 of 3395, or approximately
six percent, of pardon petitions were granted. Id.
131 Noting its specialized focus, the ATF describes itself as a “law enforcement agency
. . . that protects our communities from . . . the illegal use and trafficking of firearms.”
About the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF, https://www.atf.gov/ (last
visited Nov. 29, 2017).
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courts.  In fact, when the ATF processed relief petitions, the judiciary main-
tained a role in hearing petitions for review of denied applications.132
Courts are understandably concerned about the judicial economy impli-
cations that could arise with an influx of as-applied challenges brought by
felons, both violent and nonviolent alike.  As one district court judge aptly
noted, individualized assessments have the potential to create a “logistical
and administrative nightmare for the courts.”133  This is a reasonable con-
cern, considering that committee reports in both the House and Senate
expressed concern about the amount of time the ATF devoted to assessing
individual applications—forty man-years-per-year, to be exact.134  If the relief
program was resource intensive for an administrative agency, it follows that
that burden would be shifted to the judicial branch.
It is understandable for the judiciary to want to manage an ever-increas-
ing docket, but judicial economy concerns ought not outweigh a plaintiff’s
access to the courts for vindication of her rights.  That such burdensome
tasks may arise, from time to time, is a recognized concern, but not one that
supersedes judicial duties.  The ATF’s program could streamline the process
and help minimize the litigation load for the federal court system—perhaps
Congress should resort to providing resources to this program once again.
Handling as-applied challenges is not unfamiliar terrain for the courts,
and courts ought not shirk this duty.  As Justice Scalia put it: “When a litigant
claims that [the] legislation has denied him individual rights secured by the
Constitution, the court ordinarily asks first whether the legislation is constitu-
tional as applied to him.”135  This is a task for the courts.
This Note, of course, does not advocate that every individual petition
should succeed.  In reality, the opposite outcome—to deny the challenge—
will most often be the proper result under the proposed framework discussed
below.136  Indeed, whether reviewed under strict scrutiny or intermediate
scrutiny,137 the result often will be (and perhaps should be) that the litigant
will fail—and fail without expending substantial judicial resources.  For
example, it is entirely plausible to predict that a plaintiff seeking restoration
of firearm privileges, but who has a violent felony conviction, will (and
should) be precluded from any relief.  These as-applied challenges are only
132 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2012).  “Any person whose application for relief . . . is denied
. . . may file a petition with the United States district court.” Id.
133 Medina v. Sessions, 279 F. Supp. 3d 281, 292 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Binderup v. Att’y
Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 409 (3d Cir. 2016) (Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and dissenting from the judgment)).
134 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
135 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 743 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
136 See infra Part V.
137 There is a robust literature addressing the level of scrutiny to apply for Second
Amendment challenges—a question yet to be addressed in the highest court. See, e.g.,
Calvin Massey, Essay, Second Amendment Decision Rules, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1431, 1432 (2009)
(commenting on the lack of a scrutiny standard announced in Heller); see also supra note
128 and accompanying text.
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likely lead to uncertain results where cases involve nonviolent felons.  Does a
person convicted of tax evasion138 or the unlawful solicitation of money in
connection with an election139 have the potential to succeed on a claim
where heightened scrutiny is applied?  Possibly, yes.
V. BINDERUP AS A GUIDEPOST?
Resting on the position that the felon-in-possession ban is indeed rebut-
table,140 Part V of this Note examines Binderup as a framework for future
courts to follow.  In large part, Binderup concludes that individuals who have
committed “serious” offenses are excluded from Second Amendment protec-
tions141 based on the historical assessment that only virtuous citizens had the
right to bear arms.142  Thus, the question of virtue was not whether the liti-
gant committed a violent or nonviolent felony, but whether that offense was
“serious.”143
I will argue that courts should consider the following factors—a frame-
work with some variance from Binderup—when determining whether to grant
or deny challenges to the felon-in-possession ban: (1) nature of the offense,
(2) recidivism concerns, and (3) cross-jurisdictional consistency.
In determining the seriousness of the offense, the Binderup Court con-
sidered the following factors: (1) felony versus misdemeanor, (2) violent or
nonviolent offense, (3) sentencing, and (4) federalism considerations.144
Beginning by tackling the first factor, Binderup’s distinction between fel-
ony and misdemeanor offenses is instructive, but ought not to be dispositive.
It tends to be the case that legislatures create felonies as “more serious”
crimes and misdemeanors as “less serious crimes,”145 but whether this is nec-
138 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012).
139 18 U.S.C. § 607 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive a
donation of money . . . in connection with a[n] . . . election from a person who is located
in a room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by an officer or employee
of the United States.”).
140 See supra notes 119–24 and accompanying text.
141 Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 351 (3d Cir. 2016).
142 Id. at 348 (citing law review articles supporting the proposition that historical evi-
dence points to the conclusion that the “government could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens’”).
Binderup recognized unvirtuous citizens to be those who had committed serious crimes—
i.e., a category inclusive of both violent and nonviolent felonious offenses. Id. at 348–49.
143 Id. at 351.
144 Id. at 351–52.
145 For example, the FBI Uniform Crime Report categorizes crimes as Part I and Part II
crimes.  The Part I crimes are deemed “most serious” and include felonious offenses: homi-
cide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
Offense Definitions: Crime in the United States, 2010, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://
ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/offense-definitions (last visited
Nov. 30, 2017).  Part II offenses, presumably “less serious” include, inter alia, fraud, for-
gery, vandalism, prostitution, drug abuse violations, and gambling. Id.  How states classify
these crimes, though, can vary state by state.  For example, in Illinois, committing an
offense deemed a “hate crime” carries with it the possibility of a felony conviction, 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (2012), whereas in Indiana, hate crime legislation isn’t on the books.
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essarily a bright-line classification between virtue and lack of virtue leaves the
analysis wanting.  Indeed, the collapse of this analysis as being a dispositive
factor is illuminated in Justice Alito’s dissent in Johnson v. United States where
he noted: “At common law . . . many very serious crimes, such as kidnaping
and assault with the intent to murder or rape, were categorized as misde-
meanors.”146  In the twenty-first century, it would be unthinkable to consider
these crimes as anything less than serious, or even heinous.  If the felony-
misdemeanor dichotomy is accepted as a factor in this framework, the crime
would at least need to be considered in its contemporaneous context—i.e.,
whether the conduct is a felony on the books now as opposed to at the found-
ing.  Unfortunately, the divide between felony and misdemeanor is not so
simple, since crimes today are products of legislative creation, and may vary
from state to state.147  For this reason, I incorporate this factor into my final
consideration: cross-jurisdictional consistency.
Second, Binderup instructs courts to consider whether the offense
involved either actual or attempted violence148—with violence being a per se
disqualifying factor.149  The bright-line violence test likely would pass muster
of heightened constitutional scrutiny in any scenario brought before a court.
Firearm regulations advance the important governmental interest of protect-
ing the public safety from violent behavior, and restricting gun possession for
those with histories of violent crime undoubtedly is substantially related to
furthering the goal of public safety.150  Because the violence bright-line rule
is not susceptible to challenge, I adopt this factor in my § 922(g)(1) as-
applied challenge analysis.
Third, Binderup uses the defendant’s sentence as persuasive evidence of
the seriousness of the crime.  Significant issues arise when using sentencing
as a guide for seriousness.  First, to some extent, sentencing is already linked
to the classification of a felony versus a misdemeanor offense,151 so this fac-
tor appears not to rest on independent ground.  Felonies are typically consid-
Abdul-Hakim Shabazz, Abdul: How a Hate Crimes Law Could Work in Indiana, INDY STAR
(Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.indystar.com/story/opinion/2017/08/17/abdul-how-hate-
crimes-law-could-work-indiana/576807001/ (“Indiana is one of only five states without a
hate or bias crime law.”).
146 Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 149–50 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
147 See supra note 143.
148 The U.S Code defines a crime of violence as one that has as an element the actual,
attempted, or threatened use of “physical force against the person or property of another”
or any other felony that involves a “substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”  18 U.S.C. § 16
(2012).
149 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 352.
150 See United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (accepting under inter-
mediate scrutiny that the government objective to keep firearms out of violent felons’ pos-
session satisfies the burden of an important objective advanced by substantially related
means).
151 Indeed, the definitions of felony and misdemeanor are linked to the sentence
imposed.  Felonies tend to be crimes punishable for more than one year, or by death. See
Felony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Whereas misdemeanors are limited to
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ered more serious than misdemeanors, and a felony offense would typically
yield a higher sentence.  Thus, sentencing in many aspects seems to be a
proxy variable for the type of crime committed.
Another shortcoming of the actual sentence as a factor is that sentenc-
ing is a reflection beyond just the seriousness of the offense.  For example, in
addition to representing the seriousness of the offense, federal courts may
consider the history and characteristics of the defendant,152 and a judge’s
sentence may reflect a compromise resulting from a plea bargain between
the government and the defendant.153  As a result, the replication of the
felony-misdemeanor dichotomy and the malleable nature of sentencing
lends itself to being precluded from the analysis in determining the “serious-
ness” of the offense for purposes of this as-applied challenge.
Fourth and lastly, Binderup considers whether there is “cross-jurisdic-
tional consensus” related to the seriousness of the crime.154  This considera-
tion is of significant value, especially for a Second Amendment standard that
will be applied nationwide.  If the overwhelming majority of the states classify
an act as a felony, this would point in favor of the crime being serious.  If,
however, there is a lack of consensus—with some states finding an act to be a
felony and other states classifying it as a misdemeanor—that would raise
doubts about society’s perception of the seriousness of the offense.  Finally, if
some states don’t criminalize the act at all, the lack of criminalization in a
state might suggest that the conduct could even be law abiding and virtuous,
or at least not law obstructing.155  This federalism consideration is particu-
larly important because the individual right of the Second Amendment in a
federal constitution should not afford disparate protections based on whether
one lives in Louisiana or Indiana.
Considering these four factors from Binderup, the felony/misdemeanor
divide and sentencing consideration seem to cover, largely, the same consid-
erations—namely, the severity of punishment a crime deserves.  The felony
and misdemeanor distinction looks at the crime as a class, whereas actual
sentencing provides an individualized approach—or what a judge finds to be
the appropriate sentence based on the specific offense. Binderup correctly
posits that violent offenses would provide an automatic bar to Second
Amendment relief.156  Lastly, federalism consensus remains an important
factor to ensure a consistent approach by the states and federal government
when considering what crimes are “serious.”
punishment for a brief term, such as less than one year. See Misdemeanor, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
152 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
153 See generally Thea Johnson, Measuring the Creative Plea Bargain, 92 IND. L.J. 901
(2017).
154 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 352.
155 This is not to suggest that just because there is an absence of criminal activity that
the person is virtuous.  Indeed, many lawful activities, even constitutionally protected activi-
ties, arguably represent the antithesis of virtue—e.g., flag burning and falsifying military
awards, to name a few.
156 See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 348.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-4\NDL413.txt unknown Seq: 23  6-JUN-18 13:57
2018] as-applied  challenges  to  the  felon-in-possession  ban 1745
In addition to the first two factors I posit for the framework—the violent
nature of the offense and cross-jurisdictional, or federalism, consideration—I
advocate for a new factor: recidivism.  In other words, a plaintiff whose crimi-
nal record demonstrates that she is a repeat offender points in favor of not
granting relief from the federal firearms ban.  On the flip side, a one-time
offender who has since demonstrated a rehabilitated life, such as one with a
clean record and reformed citizenship, would have a strong case for firearm
rehabilitation.  Although the Binderup decision rejected considering recidi-
vism since it is tangential to the offense and relates more to the offender, the
D.C. Circuit in Schrader noted in dicta that the plaintiff’s renewed law-abiding
life could be relevant.157  The individual with a clean postconviction record,
so the argument goes, demonstrates a renewed virtuous life.158  Tara
McGuire advocates for a five-year span of lawful conduct to serve as the predi-
cate timespan necessary for consideration of firearm restoration.159  A bright-
line five-year rule would be easy to apply in practice, but whether or not this
number is arbitrary will likely require additional judicial development.
Taken together, the three factors: (1) nature of the crime (violent versus
nonviolent), (2) cross-jurisdictional consensus, and (3) recidivism considera-
tions, together seek to resolve whether an individual has demonstrated life as
a law-abiding citizen, such that they no longer pose a threat to the public
safety.  If a court determines these criteria are met, then the plaintiff would
have a strong case to argue that the felon-in-possession ban, as applied to
them, does not meet constitutional muster.
CONCLUSION
Over this past decade, Second Amendment jurisprudence post-Heller has
led to more questions than answers.  Ill-defined doctrine has a tangible
impact both on individuals’ legal rights and the interests of public safety.  At
this juncture, it seems unlikely that Congress will extend appropriations to
the ATF to resume an administrative process for firearm-disability review,
leaving this challenge within the judiciary’s domain.  The circuit courts’ lack
of uniformity in how to approach as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) impli-
cates concerns that Second Amendment protections may vary depending on
the jurisdiction.
In light of this judicial discord, it is time again for the Supreme Court to
speak and explicate a standard of review for challenges to firearm regula-
157 Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
158 Tara Adkins McGuire, Note, Disarmed, Disenfranchised, and Disadvantaged: The Indi-
vidualized Assessment Approach as an Alternative to Kentucky’s Felon Firearm Disability and Other
Arbitrary Collateral Sanctions Against the Non-Violent Felon Class, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 89,
111 (2014).
159 Id.
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tions.160  It is time to dispel the myth that the Second Amendment is the
“[Supreme] Court’s constitutional orphan.”161
160 In Justice Thomas’s view, the Supreme Court’s reluctance to take Second Amend-
ment cases has left the Second Amendment as a “constitutional orphan,” thereby enabling
“defiance” by the lower courts.  Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 951–52 (2018)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
161 Id.
